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FACING NEW CHALLENGES:
REFORMS IN SPAIN’S 
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
Nick Lynch
Introduction
The university system in Spain has under-
gone many changes through a series of laws
and government decrees since the ratification
of the current Spanish constitution in 1979. In
the 1980s and early 1990s, the nation saw
booming enrollment in higher education pro-
grams. Over the past ten years, the number of
Spanish universities has grown from 46 to 66.
As the university system has continued to
evolve, new challenges have arisen, including
struggles to meet the demands of the labor
market, limited student mobility, and a system
of paternalism and internal promotion among
lecturers. Furthermore, Spain’s membership in
the European Union has imposed additional
standards; and with the Bologna Declaration in
1999, the Spanish university system has been
forced to adopt various structural changes. A
2001 reform law introduced several measures
to meet the new standards as well as to address
other growing quality concerns. Criticism of
those initial reforms as well as the recent
change in government has opened the door to
further changes. Today, additional reforms are
on the horizon as the university system con-
tinues to evolve.
In this article I will evaluate the current
structure of the Spanish public university sys-
tem. Over twenty years have passed since the
1983 Ley de Reforma Universitaria — Law on
University Reform (LRU) — established the ini-
tial framework of the current Spanish univer-
sity system. To meet the challenges of 21st cen-
tury Spain, there are several structural
obstacles that the system must overcome. I will
also look at the recent reforms and identify
what still needs to be done to improve the qual-
ity and efficiency of Spanish public universities.
Historical Background
As noted above, the basis for the current
university system in Spain was established by
the LRU in 1983. Previously, public universities
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were under direct control of the government’s
Ministry of Education. The LRU marked a
major shift in power, as public universities
gained autonomy with regard to their internal
structure and hiring decisions, enabling them
to establish their own programs. Controlling
power within the public university was trans-
ferred to the claustro constituyente, a council
comprised of professors and administrators
from within the university. This council is
headed by the university rector or president.
The role of the central government shifted to
responsibility for establishing the basic legal
framework for regulating the system and the
range of official degrees, while regional or
autonomous governments became responsible
for university development and funding. The
controlling socialist government in 1983 car-
ried a slogan of a “university education for
everyone.” With the increased focus upon high-
er education, there also came increased gov-
ernment funding for the public institutions.
This funding helped to offset much of tuition
costs, opening the doors of higher education to
a larger number of Spaniards. Greater access
led to rapid growth in the student population
as well as in the number of universities. 
By the late 1980s, Spain had the second
highest percentage of the population in
Western Europe enrolled in universities; yet
spending per student was only around a third
of the Western European average. (“Higher
Education”) At the same time, the children of
the Spanish “baby boom,” which occurred
much later in Spain than in other countries,
had reached the university level. With the grow-
ing enrollment, severe overcrowding developed.
In an effort to ease the burden on public uni-
versities, a 1991 government decree established
the basis for expanding private universities. At
the time of the 1991 decree, only four private
universities existed, accounting for fewer than
three percent of all university students. Yet
despite the increase in the number of private
institutions over the next few years, public uni-
versities still dominate the market. Since the
beginning of the 21st century, the demograph-
ic pressures on university enrollment imposed
by the baby boom generation have subsided and
the growth of the number of universities has
leveled off. In 2002, there were a total of 66 uni-
versities, with 48 public institutions account-
ing for over 90 percent of students. (Chislett,
p. 55) 
Current Structure of the 
University System
At age 16 compulsory education in Spain
ends, and students have the option to sign up
for vocational courses or stay in school for an
additional two years to obtain the título de
bachillerato or senior schooling certificate.
This certificate is required of all students to sit
for the national university selection exam,
prueba de aptitud para a la uiversidad, also
referred to as the selectividad. Approximately
eight out of every ten students who take the
exam are accepted into a university. (Chislett,
p. 53) However, performance on the exam dic-
tates the course of study a student may pursue.
For admission into more advanced programs,
such as medicine, law, and engineering, stu-
dents must score higher on the selectividad.
At the university level, there are three
stages of study. The first stage, referred to as
“short-cycle” courses, typically lasts three years
and will lead to the equivalent of an associate’s
degree. The second stage, “long-cycle” cours-
es, includes the first cycle plus an additional
2–3 years of study and yields a higher degree in
the more specialized areas of study including
engineering, architecture, medicine, and vet-
erinary courses. The resulting degree is simi-
lar to a bachelor’s degree. For the third stage,
students study and undertake research for a
minimum of four additional years. A doctor’s
degree is earned after the submission and
defense of a thesis. The equivalent of a master’s
degree may be earned after 1–2 years of study
in the third stage; however, this degree is not
officially recognized.
The Need for Reform
Since the initial framework was estab-
lished in 1983, the higher education system in
Spain has seen significant growth. The number
of students enrolled in universities has risen
significantly, and the percentage of Spaniards
holding a university degree has doubled since
the 1980s. According to 2001 statistics, 24 per-
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cent of Spaniards in the 25–34 age bracket have
attained at least a university education, com-
pared to 18 percent in the same age bracket
across all OECD member countries. (“Spain,”
p. 81) However, in Spain the concern has not
been with the number of people attending uni-
versities; rather, it is with the quality of the edu-
cation that students receive. Considering that
human capital formation is one of the key con-
tributors to productivity and consequently GDP
growth, the role of the higher education sys-
tem in the labor market is an important issue.
However, unemployment rates are particularly
high in Spain for university graduates in the 25
to 34 age bracket — 14.3 percent compared to
the European Union average of 6.2 percent in
2000. (“Key Data...”) According to some
observers, this is a reflection of weaknesses in
the higher education system. (Mora et al., 2000)
They contend that the high unemployment
rates indicate that graduates are not adequate-
ly prepared for the labor market. It has been
suggested that the Spanish universities have
been slow to respond to shifts in the skill
demands of the labor market. A major problem
has been that Spain lacks an adequate mecha-
nism to address quality concerns within the 
system. 
One of the main structural weaknesses
facing the public university system throughout
the past 20 years has been the lack of a com-
prehensive nationwide system of assessing the
quality of university education programs. The
lack of such a system has made it nearly impos-
sible to identify areas of weakness and to imple-
ment changes to improve university programs.
Limited quality assessment did occur in the
1990s; however, it was restricted to universities
studying their own programs. Attempts to
develop comparative rankings and publish per-
formance indicators across universities have
been met with strong opposition from univer-
sity rectors and governing boards. According to
John Hooper in The New Spaniards, “No
authoritative comparative has ever been drawn
up within Spain because, as some university
teachers have openly admitted, none of them
dares to court the wrath of the academic com-
munity.” (Hooper, p. 271) Additionally, from a
funding standpoint, public money allocated to
universities is not linked to performance. With
the absence of a nationwide measure of quali-
ty, together with the independence of funding
from performance, there has been little com-
petitive pressure felt by public universities.
Typically, public universities have operated
independently of each other. This isolationism
has also restricted the flow of ideas among insti-
tutions. One of the underlying causes of these
difficulties has been the rigid power structure
within university governing boards. 
An additional problem facing the Spanish
university system has been excessive “inbreed-
ing” when it comes to university hiring prac-
tices. The cultural and social networks that
have developed within universities give inter-
nal candidates priority over external candidates
in the hiring process. According to one esti-
mate, approximately 90 percent of lecturers
teach in the very same department where they
completed their first degree. (Chislett, p. 52)
Though they may be better qualified for a par-
ticular position, external candidates often find
it especially difficult to obtain a position when
competing against a local candidate. An analy-
sis of a 1998 job search at Barcelona
Autonomous University serves as an example of
this bias. A candidate with twelve articles in var-
ious professional journals and who had pub-
lished a book was turned down for a post in
favor of a candidate with only one publication
but with nine years’ experience at a local uni-
versity. (Warden, “Lecturer Fights...”) This
problem stems from the disproportionate
power that the controlling council within each
university possesses. Typically, the hiring
boards appointed by the council contain few
external members, consisting primarily of uni-
versity “insiders.” Moreover, the criteria used
to make hiring decisions are often unclear and
tend to reflect an individual’s contacts within
the university rather than merit. The limited
transparency in hiring practices allows these
boards to give preference to internal candidates,
while the lack of mobility of professors across
institutions contributes to the isolationism
mentioned earlier. Such practices limit the
exchange of ideas among institutions, which
can in turn hinder the development of quality
university programs.
From the student standpoint, incentives
for quality improvement are also limited due to
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low student mobility. The process of students
seeking out the university that offers the best
program for a given course of study rarely
occurs in Spain. At most Spanish universities,
dormitories and other on-campus living facili-
ties are costly and scarce. Furthermore, grants
typically cover only enrollment fees and do not
help to subsidize living costs. As a result, stu-
dents tend to live at home and commute to the
local university each day. Additionally, the costs
of attending a university in Spain are relative-
ly low compared to the rest of the European
Union. In Spain, because the cost of a univer-
sity education is largely subsidized by the
national and regional governments, typical
tuition costs range from 3–4 thousand euros
(approximately $2,000–3,000) per year.
(“Structure of Education...”) Due to these low
tuition costs, students may feel less compelled
to shop around for the school that offers the
best return on investment. 
The cost structure also has an impact
upon a student’s decision to enter the labor
market. It is a common claim in Spain that the
university system has been used by some as a
shelter from unemployment. (Hooper, p. 270)
Part of the problem is that there are few barri-
ers to university admission. Eight out of every
ten students successfully complete the selec-
tividad, allowing them to enter into a public
institution. (Chislett, p. 53) Once a student has
been accepted into a university, there is little
incentive to rush through their studies.
Because of the relatively low cost of a universi-
ty education, coupled with the low probability
of finding a job, staying in school as long as pos-
sible is often a much more appealing alterna-
tive to entering the workforce. Only 50 percent
of students tend to finish their degree on time,
with 40–45 percent of students repeating cours-
es. (Chislett, p. 51) Statistics on the average
length of study are limited; however, according
to a Politécnica de Cataluña study of its own
students, the average time taken to complete a
three-year degree is just over six years. (Hooper,
p. 170) The problem is rooted in the forgiving
nature of the system, which allows students to
stay on as long as necessary to complete their
degree. Obviously, extended lengths of study
represent an inefficient use of public funding.
Protracted stays at universities result in high-
er costs for the public sector, but do not result
in a greater amount of human capital forma-
tion. (“Spain,” pp. 88–89) 
In general, the output of the higher edu-
cation system in Spain does not match the
demands of the labor market. This is one of the
causes of the high unemployment levels among
university graduates. A high proportion of grad-
uates are overqualified for the positions they
obtain after graduation. For example, a dispro-
portionate number of students meet the mini-
mum selectividad score required to pursue a
career in one of the more elite fields such as law
or medicine. Students who earn that score gen-
erally choose to study for a career in that field.
Consequently, there has been a surplus of
trained lawyers and doctors, but not enough
jobs in law or medicine to accommodate them.
Highly educated workers who are unable to find
work that fits their level of education will often
take on a position at a lower skill level, at least
temporarily. With a top-heavy labor force of
university educated workers, less-educated
workers have been crowded out by the more
advanced candidates for the same positions.
(Dolado et al., pp. 10–11) For many Spaniards,
it is not necessary to study at a university; voca-
tional programs that provide more specific
occupational training would be more appro-
priate. Yet, vocational training programs in
Spain are underdeveloped. Only 31.2 percent of
secondary students opt for vocational training
courses. Compared to the OECD average of 47
percent, Spain is lagging behind in this field.
(“Spain,” p. 86) Channeling more students into
vocational programs is necessary to better bal-
ance the output from universities with the
needs of the labor market. 
In addition to labor market concerns,
there are other structural weaknesses that face
the public university system. For example, the
current cost structure of the university system
has raised concerns regarding access to public
university programs for students from lower-
class households. Public funds are appropriat-
ed to each university by the national govern-
ment as a lump sum. The use and distribution
of these funds are dictated by the governing
council within each university. These funds are
typically used to drive down the cost of tuition
for all students. However, use of government
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funds to offset tuition costs for all students
comes at the expense of grants and aid to lower-
income households. Despite the relatively low
tuition costs, paying for a university education
is still not feasible for many of these low income
families without additional aid. The main crit-
icism has been that a regressive system has
developed, one that provides greater benefit to
middle-to-upper-class students. With limited
aid available, the current cost structure
excludes many students with lower incomes. In
2000, it was estimated that students from
upper-class backgrounds were five times more
likely to attend a university as those from 
lower-class backgrounds. (Warden, “Spanish
Access ...”)
Changes to the System
For 18 years following the enactment of
the LRU in 1983, the overall structure of the
Spanish public university system had remained
relatively unchanged. As the 21st century
arrived, however, two significant events marked
the start of a transitional period for the system.
At a meeting of 29 European countries in 1999,
the Bologna Declaration was passed in an effort
to standardize university education across
Europe. With the goal of creating a uniform
“European Area for Higher Education,” educa-
tion ministers representing 29 countries pro-
posed a series of goals that each country’s
national higher education policy should aim to
meet by 2010. The goals include:
1. Adopting a system of two standard
degree cycles, undergraduate and 
graduate;
2. Establishing a uniform system of 
credits;
3. Facilitating student mobility through-
out member countries; 
4. Launching cooperation initiatives to
develop common curricula and
methodologies. 
Achieving the goals set forth by the declaration
has been the main driving force behind changes
to the public university system in Spain; and in
2000 the Spanish government proposed a series
of comprehensive reforms that eventually took
the form of the 2001 Ley Organica de Univer-
sidades (Organic Law of Universities — LOU). 
The original objective of the LOU was to
implement changes that would move the
Spanish higher education system into compli-
ance with the Bologna Declaration. Provisions
of the law included a restructuring of the
degree program according to the guidelines of
the Bologna Declaration and the adoption of a
“diploma supplement,” which contains detailed
information about the degree holder’s training
and credentials. The diploma supplement is
expected to facilitate mobility of graduates and
enhance employment opportunities through-
out member countries. The details of the sup-
plement will give employers a greater under-
standing of the educational history of a
potential employee. 
In addition to meeting the goals of the
Bologna Declaration through the LOU, the gov-
ernment also attempted to address some of the
structural issues discussed earlier. The LOU
established the National Agency for Quality
Assessment and Accreditation, commonly
referred to by the acronym ANECA (Agencia
Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y
Acreditación). As noted earlier, although assess-
ment of institutional quality occurred through-
out the 1990s, it was limited to individual uni-
versities. The creation of the agency will
attempt to institutionalize these efforts. The
new agency will address four main areas: the
assessment of academics, the evaluation of a
university’s own quality assessment programs,
the certification of quality, and the accredita-
tion process.
Additionally, in response to the concerns
regarding public university hiring practices, the
law called for a major shift in the governing of
public universities. As one of the more signifi-
cant reforms, the LOU called for the restruc-
turing of university governing boards to include
a larger proportion of outside representatives.
Furthermore, teachers who wished to be con-
sidered for a position at a public university
would first have to take a national test. Based
upon the results of this “habilitation exam,”
teachers would first be ranked and then entered
into a pool from which universities will make
their selection. In public universities, the num-
ber of tenured positions will be reduced to a
maximum of 50 percent, down significantly
from the previous level of 70 percent. Still other
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structural changes include the elimination of
the selectividad exam by 2004. 
Criticisms of the Reforms
Upon its introduction in 2001, the LOU
was met with mixed reactions from the public.
The reforms aimed at meeting the goals of the
Bologna Declaration were welcomed; however,
attempts to reform the university governance
were met with considerable opposition by uni-
versity rectors, teachers, and students. Holding
an absolute majority in congress, the Popular
Party (PP) had been able to introduce the law
after only limited discussion with university
leaders. Hundreds of thousands from the aca-
demic community took to the streets of Madrid
in 2001 to protest what they believed was an
attempt to weaken the constitutionally guar-
anteed university autonomy. However, these
protests were largely political in nature in that
they were more concerned with the threat to
their power to make decisions. They were much
less concerned with the future of the universi-
ty system. Nevertheless, the outpouring of crit-
icism from the academic community led the
government to scale back the reforms package.
The law had originally called for one-third rep-
resentation from members outside the univer-
sity on public university governing boards.
However, after the confrontation with the aca-
demic community, that number was signifi-
cantly reduced. On boards that approach up to
50 members, only three outside members on
the governing board would be required. 
The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
(PSOE), one of Spain’s main political parties,
has been one of the strongest opponents of the
provisions of the LOU. In March 2004 the
PSOE, led by Prime Minister Zapatero, came
into power after unexpectedly defeating the PP
in the national elections. The change in gov-
ernment has put the 2001 reforms in even
greater jeopardy. Almost immediately follow-
ing the election, the new government
announced that it planned to repeal several key
elements of the LOU. The habilitation exam for
potential lecturers has been replaced with a
national system of accreditation. Furthermore,
the suspension of the selectividad, which was
scheduled for the fall of 2004, has been post-
poned. Overall, the new government seems to
be committed to restoring the power to uni-
versities that was taken away by the LOU and,
as of spring 2005, is in the process of drafting
a new reforms package to officially replace the
LOU. With the new reforms package, there are
several structural issues that must be addressed
to facilitate continued improvements in quali-
ty and efficiency. Several of these issues are dis-
cussed in the next section.
Further University Reform Needs
The reforms initially introduced with the
LOU can be regarded as a first step toward
improving the quality and efficiency of the pub-
lic university system in Spain. The most sig-
nificant reform introduced by the LOU was the
creation of ANECA, the quality assessment
agency. Identification of areas of weakness has
been a considerable challenge to improving the
quality of university programs. Previously, any
publication of university performance had been
rare. By institutionalizing this process through
ANECA, there will be greater transparency of
performance indicators. This is expected to
make the public university system more com-
petitive and spark incentives for improvement.
However, there is still further room for improv-
ing quality assessment in Spain. Of the four
areas that ANECA evaluates, only the accredi-
tation process is compulsory. The three remain-
ing areas — assessment of academics, evalua-
tion of a university’s own quality assessment
programs, and certification of quality — are
still voluntary. Additionally, though the agency
will collect a considerable amount of informa-
tion, this information will not be used to pub-
lish any form of comparative rankings of the
public universities in Spain. 
The absence of a comprehensive ranking
of universities can be linked to the lack of a
competitive environment among the Spanish
public universities. Establishment of such a sys-
tem would work to improve quality on two lev-
els. From a funding standpoint, linking relative
performance to government funding would
compel each institution to expand upon its own
internal quality assessment and improvement
measures. Furthermore, a nationwide ranking
of each institution would allow students to seek
43
out the best programs to fit their educational
needs. Currently, as noted earlier, most stu-
dents attend the local university in their home
region. The possibility of losing students is an
added incentive for university leaders to place
greater emphasis upon improving institution-
al quality.
University Governance Reforms
Despite some changes for the better, the
LOU still did not go far enough to address a crit-
ical problem facing the public university sys-
tem, the rigid power structure that dominates
many public universities. The current system
tends to give preferential treatment in hiring
to internal candidates and is a considerable
obstacle to improvements in institutional qual-
ity. These hiring practices are often blind to a
candidate’s merits and qualifications. In the
end, it is the students who are most adversely
impacted because they are not receiving
instruction from the best available lecturers.
Reforming hiring practices is an important step
toward improving the overall quality of educa-
tion in Spain. The measures introduced by the
LOU were not embraced by the academic com-
munity, as I noted earlier. But this was not
because of opposition to the idea itself, but
rather because of opposition to the process by
which the measures were drafted. The govern-
ment’s attempt to reform university governance
with very little input from university rectors
was viewed as a challenge to university auton-
omy. Future reforms will require a joint effort
between the government and university lead-
ers to develop a solution to this problem.
Structural Changes
One of the major criticisms of the exist-
ing public university system is that it does not
fit the labor needs of society. According 
to Gustavo Villapolos, the Rector of the
Complutense University in Madrid, universities
should be “for training elites and not the mass-
es” (as quoted in Hooper, p. 270). Recently, the
PSOE announced the postponement of the sus-
pension of the selectividad. The PSOE holds the
view that such an exam is a necessity because
successful completion of the exam guarantees
access to public university programs for a large
portion of the population. However, the oppos-
ing view is that the end of the national selec-
tion exam is necessary to allow individual insti-
tutions to establish their own criteria for
admissions. Ideally, the selection process would
then become more competitive, limiting enroll-
ment into certain university programs.
Contrary to beliefs within the PSOE, the effect
of such a change would not be to reduce the
number of those who attend a public universi-
ty; rather, it would serve to channel more peo-
ple into vocational and technical schools. This
would in turn help to bring about a better dis-
tribution of students that best fits the needs of
the labor market. As it stands now, much of the
time spent in universities by the 20 to 25-year-
old segment of the population is wasted, as
there are not enough jobs for university grad-
uates.
In addition to addressing the role of the
public university system in the labor market,
reforming the cost structure of public univer-
sities is necessary. As noted earlier, the current
cost structure has led to the use of universities
as a shield against unemployment. Students
often choose to enter into university study
because there is such a low opportunity cost.
Students also are not compelled to finish on
time because the cost to remain in school for
an additional year or two is low. One solution
that can potentially eliminate both of these
problems is a rise in tuition costs. A rise in
tuition costs would help to initially divert more
students away from universities and into the
cheaper vocational programs. Additionally,
higher tuition costs would provide students
with a much greater incentive to complete their
studies on time and enter into the labor force.
A rise in tuition costs would also help to allevi-
ate the regressive pricing system for universi-
ties that tends to exclude students from lower-
income families. As discussed earlier, under the
current system much of the costs of education
are offset with public funds. However, most of
these funds are used to directly drive down
tuition costs for all students. This has driven
the tuition costs well below the price that stu-
dents from higher income families would be
willing to pay, yet still remain beyond the reach
of many poorer families. By channeling a larg-
er proportion of the government funds into
financial aid programs through a rise in tuition
costs, a university education would be much
more accessible to students coming from lower-
income backgrounds. 
Conclusions
Since the initial groundwork for the pub-
lic university system in Spain was laid in 1983,
great progress has been made to turn Spain into
a more educated society. The proportion of
those who now hold a post-secondary degree
has skyrocketed. However, further changes are
necessary to enable the system to reach its full
potential. It is not a question of the number of
people who have post-secondary training;
rather, there is a need to better match this
training to the needs of society. Higher tuition
costs will induce greater personal investment
in a degree, compelling students to finish on
time and funneling more students into voca-
tional programs. These higher tuition costs can
also help to alleviate equity concerns by increas-
ing funding to financial aid programs.
Additionally, there is significant potential for
improving the quality of educational programs
at universities. Furthermore, greater publica-
tion of performance indicators through ANECA
will provide greater incentives for Spanish uni-
versities to improve quality as students will be
able to seek out the best programs. Overall, a
strong base for public university in Spain exists,
but further reforms can help Spain reach its
untapped potential.
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